SUBMISSION TO
THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY
INTO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

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1. Introduction

My name is Tim Tate. For almost 40 years I have worked as a journalist, documentary film maker and author.

I do not claim to be an expert on child sexual abuse. However, many of my books and films\(^1\) have investigated the problem, and have brought me into extended working contact with police and prosecutors (both in the UK and internationally) victims and paedophiles, social workers and therapists. As a result I believe I have first-hand information which may be useful to the Independent Inquiry Into Child Sexual Abuse. This submission contains only information of which I have direct knowledge.

I should stress that my work was never motivated by direct personal experience. I was not abused as a child and until I was asked to look at the problem as journalist I had given little thought to the issues of child sexual abuse, paedophilia and child pornography.

In the early 1980s I was working for the BBC radio (later television) investigative programme, *Checkpoint*. I was asked to look at complaints from children in care that they were being badly treated. I made two programmes – one radio, one television – about their plight and, in particular, about the use of behaviour modification techniques and drugs to control or restrain them\(^2\).

Thereafter, several of the social workers and former police officers who I met while those programmes suggested I should investigate the worldwide trade in child pornography and its relationship with (loosely) organized groups of paedophiles. When I moved to the ITV franchise, Central Television, in 1985 (as part of the launch team for what would become *The Cook Report*), I began working on this suggestion.

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\(^1\) A full list of my relevant films and books – and the awards my work has been given – is attached as

\(^2\) *Children In Care: Checkpoint, BBC Radio 4, 1983 & The Mindbenders, Checkpoint, BBC1, 1984*
For the next two years I met and formed close working relationships with the only specialist police unit attempting to combat child pornography, and with the most important specialist in enabling paedophiles understand - and control - their sexual attraction to children.

Both of those working relationships (detailed in later pages) would provide me with the first-hand knowledge contained in this submission.

2 (a). Background: The Law in the mid 1980s

In the mid 1980s it was illegal England and Wales to have sexual contact with girls or boys under the age of consent. The age of consent for girls was 16; for boys it was 21.

It was also illegal, under the 1959 Obscene Publications Act, to publish in England and Wales – whether for profit or not – something which:

“is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear he matter contained or embodied in it.”

However, there was no law prohibiting the possession of pornography (whether adult or child) and no specific legislation covering indecent or obscene film or video images of children.

2 (b). Background: the societal and political background

The late 1970s and early 1980s experienced the emergence of a paedophile liberation movement, and a largely-simultaneous seismic change in technology. Together, these created societal and political pressures on governments and the police service: both were slow to react and, as a result, policy and practice for the protection of children lagged behind the reality of the situation.

3 The decisive case of DPP v Whyte (1972) established that it was not enough for one person to be depraved or corrupted: it had to be proved that a significant number of persons likely to have come into contact with the photograph, film or sound recording would be corrupted.
The paedophile liberation movement began in 1974 as a small sub-committee within the Scottish Minorities Group\(^4\) in Edinburgh. Within a year, this migrated to London, joined forces with a recently-established group in the capital, Paedophile Action Liberation (PAL) and then announced itself publicly as a new campaigning group, the Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE)\(^5\).

PIE (and its precursor groups) argued that adult-child sexual contact was both natural and, in general, either harmless or positively beneficial. It justified these claims by referencing the 1948 Kinsey report\(^6\): one chapter (Chapter 5) of this worldwide best-seller had purported to show – using tables and graphs detailing apparent scientific experiments - that children as young as four months old were capable of experiencing multiple orgasms (and, therefore, pleasure) when stimulated by adults.\(^7\)

In 1975 PIE submitted a paper to the Criminal Law Revision Committee. It proposed lowering the age of consent to four, with children above this age presumed to be able to give their assent to sexual contact with an adult.\(^8\) PIE also inserted itself into the National Council For Civil Liberties (NCCL).

Whilst PIE’s proposals were not adopted, there is evidence to suggest that the overall message it sought to put forward was receiving consideration within the UK government. A 1979 Home Office Study Document\(^9\) floated the idea of reducing the de-facto age of consent for heterosexual acts to 13. It cited the 1948 Kinsey report as a key source document. (The suggestion was not adopted.)

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\(^4\) This later changed its name to the Scottish Homosexual Rights Group.

\(^5\) The problems posed by PIE are explored more fully later in this submission.

\(^6\) *Sexuality in The Human Male;* Kinsey et al; University of Indiana, 1948.

\(^7\) These so-called scientific experiments were, in reality, no more than ‘reports’ sent by individual paedophiles which described their (unsupervised) abuse of children. A full investigation of was made in my Channel 4 documentary, *Kinsey’s Paedophiles.* This film can be viewed on my website: www.timtate.co.uk/films. There is no password protection.

\(^8\) ‘Evidence on the law relating to, and penalties for, certain sexual offences involving children’. Keith Hose, PIE, November 1975.

\(^9\) “*Sexual Offences, Consent and Sentencing*”: Roy Walmsley & Karen White. Home Office Research Study No. 54. Copy attached in the Appendices to this submission.
2 (c). Background: the policing of child abuse in the mid 1980s

Contact abuse of children by adults was then dealt with, reactively, by local or regional police forces and social services department. There was no nationally-coordinated specific register of men (or women) who had been convicted of sexual offences against children. Nor was there any pro-active policing aimed at intervening to protect known or future victims.

Child pornography – indecent images of children, as we now term this – was ill-understood and even more badly policed. The only force which maintained a dedicated unit investigating IIIOC was the Metropolitan Police. Its Obscene Publications Branch – then designated T013 – was based inside New Scotland Yard and, in addition to handling investigations in the Greater London area, had become the only law enforcement department which maintained any sort of intelligence on providers and consumers of IIIOC throughout the United Kingdom.

TO13 was a uniformed, rather than detective, branch. This had been Metropolitan Police policy since the exposure of corruption in its precursor squad during the 1970s, which Mr. Justice Mars-Jones described as being “on a scale which beggars description”. A decade later the legacy of this scandal was a lingering (if unfounded) suspicion of, and hostility towards, TO13. Its officers reported a belief within the Metropolitan Police that “what we do is not important. We get treated as woodentops ... and when it comes to handing out extra money to fund operations, it usually goes to the glory squads.”

3. Child Pornography investigation 1986-87

When I began researching the Cook Report documentary investigating child pornography in 1986 I established contact with the then senior officer in TO13, Superintendent Iain Donaldson. He described himself deeply troubled by the problem of indecent images of children, and by the paucity of resources at his disposal for pursuing those who traded them.

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Prior to 1983, child pornography (IIOC) had been primarily a sub-genre within the commercial adult pornography market. In 1969 Denmark had legalized the production and sale of all forms of pornography – adult and child.\footnote{It remained an offence, however, to show obscene material to anyone under the age of 18.} For the next ten years, commercial Danish pornography companies produced at least 36 separate 8mm films (each duplicated a large – if unquantified – number of times for worldwide distribution), and a much greater number of magazine series, showing the sexual abuse of children. Many were barely out of infancy: all were pre-pubertal.

The titles of these commercially-produced child pornography films and magazines – *Child Love, Sucking Daddy, Lolita, Pre-teen Trio* and *Fucking Children* are representative examples – became familiar to law enforcement officials throughout the world. They were distributed professionally by registered companies and were frequently recovered in police raids on contact sex abusers across three continents\footnote{These films and magazines, primarily produced by Rodox Color Climax Corporation of Copenhagen, were not unique: other Danish, Swiss and American pornographers produced rival series. But Rodox-CCC’s material was the most widely distributed – and seized.}.

By 1983 the child pornography market was changing. Three years earlier Denmark had abandoned its ‘liberalisation’ experiment and commercial production had ceased. Increasing efforts by US Customs and Postals services, conducted internationally, were making commercial distribution of the films and magazines less attractive to mainstream adult pornography wholesalers and retailers. Instead, the films and magazines were increasingly traded – often without payment - between paedophiles and/or loosely-formed groups or ‘rings’ of those with a sexual attraction to children. This posed challenges for traditional police efforts to interdict the material.

This challenge increased when, in 1983, Sony and JVC released the first domestic video camcorders. This technology revolutionized the creation of IIOC. Films and photographs no longer needed developing; copying videos could easily and cheaply be carried out at home, rather than requiring expensive tele-cine equipment.
The advent of camcorders and video-cassette recorders re-booted child pornography as a cottage industry largely run by and for paedophiles themselves. This made policing it much more difficult.

By 1986 TO13 had a staffing complement of Donaldson, five sergeants and five constables. However, of this working team of 10 (Donaldson was the supervising administrator) only two were tasked with investigating child pornography. Metropolitan Police policy required the other eight to police adult pornography – both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. Donaldson was attempting to change this; but his superiors refused his requests to prioritize IIOC.

It was for this reason that Donaldson agreed to co-operate with the Cook Report. Two officers – a sergeant and a constable – were assigned as liaison between the production team and TO13.

I and a colleague conducted three separate undercover operations. The first was aimed at testing the extent to which IIOC was being traded semi-openly via top-shelf softcore pornography magazines. With the agreement of TO13 (which was not then permitted to conduct such sting operations) adverts were placed in several publications, used generic code-words to solicit IIOC.

The second targeted commercial sex shops in Amsterdam. TO13 believed (correctly) that Holland was the main wholesale global ‘staging post’ for all pornography, including IIOC. Using hidden cameras we asked sex shop vendors in the Red Light District if they could sell us child pornography.

The third focused on what was then a new phenomenon: computer bulletin boards. US law enforcement had identified these pre-world wide web, internet-based groups as a growing medium by which paedophiles exchanged or traded IIOC.

Simultaneously, I arranged to meet with and seek assistance from the two primary American law enforcement agencies working to police the global market in child pornography: US Customs Child Pornography and Protection Unit and US Postals’ Prohibited Mailings Division (both based in Washington DC).
It was agreed that the results of all these co-ordinated investigations would be turned over to TO13, as well as being included in the *Cook Report* documentary.\(^{13}\)

The UK stings – both via top-shelf magazines and bulletin boards – produced a handful of responses which offered copies of (mostly) commercial child pornography magazines or films, together with one offer to ‘share’ privately-made still obscene photos of children being penetrated by adult men. This latter led to a filmed ‘doorstep’ interview of the man, a self-confessed paedophile, who was subsequently charged and convicted.

The Amsterdam sting caught a sex shop proprietor willing to sell child pornography: in covertly-shot footage, he demonstrated how he would evade British law enforcement by dismantling the videocassette and sending only the tape inside. This spool duly arrived at the *Cook Report* offices less than a week later: it showed a pre-pubescent girl being molested and sexually abused. Subsequent technical analysis (by US Customs) showed it to have been shot on a camcorder, in Germany, within the previous two years.

The liaison with US Customs and US Postals yielded two lists of known British consumers of child pornography. Each of the men on these lists had purchased IIOC from a US-based individual or (in one case) business, who had all been prosecuted for commercial distribution of child pornography by one or other of the two agencies.

The senior officer from Customs, John Sullivan, and his counterpart at Postals, Dan Mihalko, confirmed that they had previously sent these names to the UK government. (Neither were clear on the mechanics of this, but both understood that the lists had been sent to the Home Office by the US State Department and/or the US Treasury Department.) Both expressed mild surprise that they had not received any follow up or request for supporting evidence.

\(^{13}\) The film was transmitted in the summer of 1987, reaching an audience in excess of 12 million viewers. It can be viewed at the following site: [REDACTED] Because of the changed data protection position pertaining today, it is password protected. For the IICSA’s use only, the password is [REDACTED].
I took these two lists (as well as the list of those who had responded to our UK stings) to Supt. Donaldson at TO13. He had seen neither of the US lists before; none of the names of those British child pornography customers were listed as IIOC consumers on TO13’s hand-written card index.

Donaldson believed that this evidence – coupled with the fact that it had not been sent to him by the Home Office and/or his superiors at New Scotland Yard – provided him with ammunition for his struggle to prioritize child pornography investigations within TO13. It was agreed that we would subsequently film an interview with him, during which Roger Cook would show him the lists and ask if he had ever seen them before. Donaldson undertook to play dumb and appear surprised by them, believing that the resulting embarrassment when the documentary was broadcast would strengthen his hand with Metropolitan Police management.

Within two years of the programme, new legislation was introduced making possession of child pornography illegal. The prioritizing of child pornography within TO13 took several more years to achieve. In the interim, it appears that little or no work was done to investigate the names of the British consumers provided by US Customs and US Postals.

I understand that Counsel to your Inquiry has been given copies of these lists, which have been labelled (not by me) “The Tim Tate Lists”. A copy is provided in the confidential appendices to this submission.

An examination of these lists shows that several men identified on them were subsequently convicted of a series of serious offences including the possession and distribution of IIOC, as well as contact offences against children. However, these prosecutions did not take place until several years after the lists were given to TO13, thus leaving the men free to commit offences in the interim.

Specifically:-

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14 By Peter McKelvie, to Ben Emerson QC.
• **Charles Napier (No. 39 on US Customs List).**
  A former official of PIE, Napier was convicted in 1995 on two counts of sexually assaulting an underage boy. In 2015 he was further convicted of sexually abusing 23 boys between 1967 and 1983.
  
  **The first prosecution took place eight years after the US Customs list including his name was given to TO13.**

• **Graham R. Wake (No. 50 on US Customs List)**
  In 1993 Wake was convicted of sexually abusing boys throughout the 1980s. He was also found to have hundred of IIOC in his home. Police also found evidence that he had been corresponding with two other men who had responded positively to the *Cook Report* sting.
  
  **This prosecution took place six years after the US Customs list including his name was given to TO13**

• **Terence James Waters (No. 52 on US Customs List)**
  A former member of PIE, in 2009 Waters – an art teacher - was convicted of possessing several thousand IIOC, including drawings of children being raped. The court heard that Waters met regularly with other paedophiles and shared more than 14,000 images (photographic and video) showing the sexual abuse of children. In 2011 he was further charged with (and admitted) seven counts of indecent assault and five of indecency with a child. The court heard evidence that Waters had built a “secret room” in the school loft above his art room: during the 1970s and 1980s he took boys there to abuse them.
  
  **These prosecutions took place twenty-two and twenty-four years (respectively) after the US Customs list including his name was given to TO13**

Had Supt. Donaldson been permitted by Metropolitan Police management to assign adequate resources to investigating these men in 1987, many children could have been protected from the sexual abuse they subsequently suffered.

Following the broadcast, and by agreement with Supt. Donaldson I remained in working contact with the two TO13 officers he had assigned as liaison. I did so because I was then working on a book about child pornography\(^\text{15}\), and because I was undertaking new investigations for it as well as for further documentaries on the issue of child sexual abuse.

To further these I worked closely with the leading UK expert on paedophiles and sexual offending. Ray Wyre, a former probation officer, ran a court-approved programme to work with paedophiles with the aim of preventing future offending. He was also a consultant to a number of police forces and social services departments on the issue.

In 1994 we jointly produced a documentary and a book investigating the crimes of the serial child killer Robert Black\(^\text{16,17}\). While serving a life sentence for abducting and almost killing a child, Black had asked Wyre to work with him so that he (Black) could understand what drove him to offend. The sessions were tape recorded, with Black’s permission.

As well as demonstrating a succession of historic failures by police and courts (and the importance of child pornography in sustaining Black’s paedophilia), the documentary also exposed a very serious and continuing problem in the collation and distribution of intelligence about paedophiles.

The National Criminal Intelligence Service was established in 1992, with funding from the Home Office. It was tasked with gathering intelligence on a series of crime priorities, and with disseminating that to police forces in the areas where the criminals operated. Child pornography and organized child sexual abuse formed one of the stand-alone branches within NCIS.

\(^{15}\) *Child Pornography – An Investigation*; op cit.

\(^{16}\) *The Murder of Childhood*; “Dispatches” (Channel 4, 1994): The documentary can be viewed at [www.timtate.co.uk/films](http://www.timtate.co.uk/films). There is no password protection.

Prior to the formation of NCIS, details of criminal offences were held on either or both the Police National Computer or the Criminal records Office database. Both recorded this information by name of offender, rather than by type of offending, thus making intelligence co-ordination more cumbersome.

The only unique database of adults known to have involvement with IIOC and/or organized paedophilia was a manual card index maintained by a civilian co-ordinator in TO13. This index contained approximately 3,000 names, including vital cross-referencing: it also included several hundred names and addresses of those who had been members of the Paedophile Information Exchange (and its precursor group, Paedophile Action Liberation). These names had been found on PIE membership lists seized in or around 1978.

In early 1994 I was informed by one of TO13’s officers that NCIS had insisted on taking possession of, as well as the responsibility to maintain in future, the card index database. I contacted the then head of TO13, Supt. Mike Hames. He confirmed that, despite his strenuous objections, the card index was being handed over to NCIS. No back up copy was made.

I sought (and was granted) a filmed interview with NCIS for use within the Robert Black documentary. During this, it emerged that despite being convicted of the sexually-motivated abduction and attempted murder of a child four years earlier (as well as previous contact offences against children) and the fact that he was awaiting trial on charges of three other sexually motivated murders of pre-pubescent girls, Robert Black’s name was not included on the NCIS database. The explanation given, on camera, by NCIS was that “he has never come to our notice, and the information that is available on him has never been submitted to our office.”

There were two reasons Britain’s most dangerous paedophile was not listed on the country’s now sole dedicated database of child sex offenders, fully two years after NCIS was established.

18 The documentary, including this on-camera statement, can be viewed at www.timtate.co.uk/films. There is no password protection.
The first was that NCIS system was not compatible with any other police computers: it could not access the CRO, the PNC or even feed into HOLMES, the database created as a result of the disasters of the manually-based Yorkshire Ripper investigation.

The second was that the NCIS paedophile unit was grossly understaffed. For the first two years it had a full time staff of just one officer (with one occasional part-time assistant). In late 1993 this was increased to two officers (with part time help), but staffing was not intended ever to grow larger than three full time members. By contrast the NCIS football hooligan unit, housed in the next door office, had a full-time complement of between 11 and 12 officers.

What became of the 3,000 names hand-written on the TO13 card index and which was, by the end of 1994 held by NICIS? There has never been an official answer to this. But within a year I obtained evidence that these names had not been entered on to the NCIS computers.

In 1995 I made a film for ITV which investigated the problem of British (and American) paedophiles travelling to the Philippines to sexually abuse children there. With the assistance of the Philippines police and government, I obtained the files on a number of British and US citizens who had been charged, prosecuted or deported for contact offences involving pre-pubescent boys and girls. These files had been sent to NCIS in 1992.

In America, the FBI used the Philippines’ documents to mount undercover operations which proved the men were also committing paedophilic offences in the US. Also at the time, several western governments had passed laws which enabled them to prosecute their own nationals for contact offences committed in foreign countries.

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In Britain, the Home Office refused to put forward similar legislation. Instead, a Conservative Home Office minister (in an on camera interview) assured us that NCIS was across the information, and that he had confidence in its ability to deal with the intelligence gained from its counterparts in the Philippines.\(^\text{20}\)

However, when presented with the files on known British paedophiles (which had been provided to it three years earlier) the then head of NICIS’ paedophile unit, denied ever having seen them. When asked, on camera, why we had been able to obtain this information but he had not, Chief Inspector Bryan Drew said “\textit{presumably because you asked for it}”.

One of the men identified in the Philippines files – and who was also shown, in covert filming in the documentary, boasting how he would pay off either the prosecutor or the victims of his abuse – was Douglas Slade. Slade had been a founding member of Paedophile Action Liberation (PAL); his name was on the old TO13 card index. By 1995 it had apparently still not been entered on to the NCIS database.

Twenty one years later, in July 2016, Douglas Slade was convicted of a series of contact sexual offences a Bristol Crown Court. These had taken place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

\textbf{The PIE membership lists which included Slade’s name and address were seized in 1978. Had action been taken against him then, many of those British victims could have been spared the abuse he inflicted on them.}

\textbf{Further: had the Home Office adopted – and used – extra-territorial legislation, much of Slade’s abuse in the Philippines might have been prevented. Nor was Douglas Slade an isolated example.}

\(^{20}\) This policy was reversed following the election of the Labour government in 1997. The Sexual Offences Act 1997 created extra-territorial legislation, allowing for the prosecution in UK courts of men alleged to have abused children abroad. However, research published in 2014 suggested that in the intervening years only five such prosecutions had taken place (https://www.theguardian.com/social-care-network/2014/dec/19/simon-harris-british-citizens-child-abuse)
5. **Historic Child Sexual Abuse Investigations 2013 - 2016**

In 2012, following the revelations about Jimmy Saville, Peter McKelvie, a senior former child protection professional, contacted Tom Watson MP with information indicating that prominent figures in politics had historically been involved in abusing children. In the early 1990s Mr. McKelvie had been a central figure in exposing the activities of Peter Righton; documents he had discovered during this investigation suggested the existence of a well-connected network of highly-placed paedophiles. Mr. Watson raised the matter in the House of Commons.

As a result, the Metropolitan Police established a ‘scoping exercise’ – Operation Fernbank – to examine the strength (or otherwise) of evidence. This subsequently became a full-fledged criminal investigation under the title Operation Fernbridge. At the same time, other politicians and parts of the media began their own enquiries and went on to publish a succession of stories about a VIP paedophile ring.

In the Spring of 2014 I was asked to meet with Tom Watson MP in his office at Westminster to discuss my knowledge of alleged historic offences. Several weeks earlier I had also had the first of two meetings with senior officers from Operation Fairbank/Fernbridge: these took place at Empress State Building, the Metropolitan Police station from which Fairbank/Fernbridge operated. The subjects of these meetings were as follows:

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21 The “investigative website” *Exaro News* took the lead in these stories and has claimed credit for causing, among other police enquiries, Operation Midland. I have been, and remain, extremely critical of *Exaro News* because its stories relied on the sole and uncorroborated testimony of single individuals. This is bad – and irresponsible – journalism: however, because I have no direct knowledge of the allegations which were the subject of Operation Midland, this submission does not address them.
(i) PIE

I had investigated the Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) for my book on child pornography.\(^{22}\) Using the organization’s own (published) documents I had shown that during the 1970s it had acted, \textit{inter alia}, as a means for paedophiles to share or trade child pornography. The ‘Contacts’ section of its magazine, \textit{Magpie}, contained advertisements soliciting IIOC: advert no. 373 was typical.

\textit{Doctor, male. Poet and author, interested [in] photos little girls in white pants and little boys out of white pants ...}

There was also evidence which suggested that PIE’s leadership had managed to run the organization from inside the Home Office building in Queen Anne’s Gate London.

In 1979, Stephen Adrian Smith (also known as Stephen Freeman) began working for an electrical company contracted to undertake work at the Home Office. In 1986 he published a book in which he claimed to have stored PIE material in an office in the basement between 1979 and 1982, and to have had PIE’s telephone line directed to a phone in that office.

In the summer of 1984, Smith and two other PIE – David Joy and Peter Bremner - officials were arrested and charged with sending indecent material through the post. Joy and Bremner were tried and convicted, but Smith fled to Holland. The Home Office initially sought his extradition but subsequently abandoned the attempt. No explanation was given.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Home Office had come under public pressure to proscribe PIE as an organization. It declined to do so, apparently on legal grounds. The legal advice which would – presumably – have been provided by the Attorney General’s office to the Home Secretary has never been published.

\(^{22}\) \textit{Child Pornography – An Investigation} (op. cit)
In 1981 the Conservative MP Geoffrey Dickens had named Sir Peter Hayman, a senior diplomat, as a member; he subsequently submitted to the Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, a dossier which, according to newspaper reports, identified up to eight other high profile paedophiles. (In 2014 Lord Brittan told newspapers he had no recollection of this dossier.)

In July 2013, in response to a Freedom of Information request from a journalist, the Home Office published the results of an internal review (“Executive Summary of review of Home Office organised child sex abuse files”) which showed that it could not locate the so-called Dickens dossier, but which did disclose the existence of 11 empty files. The contents of these files had, according to the review, been correctly destroyed in line with contemporary “applicable document retention policies”; their titles, however, had survived and these indicated the files had related to PIE.  

I submitted an FOI request for those 11 titles, and for a copy of the “applicable document retention policies”. The Home Office repeatedly refused to provide either, before claiming that it never had the information in the first place.

In the meantime, however, questioning of the Home Office Permanent Secretary, Mark Sedwill, by the Home Affairs Select Committee led to the disclosure that rather than 11 relevant files, the Home Office had now discovered a total of 114.

Mr. Sedwill was asked by committee chair, Keith Vaz MP, to provide the file titles. He initially refused, but subsequently complied. Throughout this episode, and even after Mr. Sedwill sent the file titles to the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Home Office continued to refuse my request for exactly the same information.

23 The report stated: “the recorded title files, together with media reports of events at the time, give some indication of the probable contents of these files”.

24 July 8, 2014.
In early June, 2014 I was put in contact with Tim Hulbert, a retired social services manager. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Mr. Hulbert, had been a paid consultant to the Voluntary Services Unit. This was an interdepartmental organization, based inside the Home Office: its role was to co-ordinate government action across different departments and ensure there was no conflict between the aims and actions supported. Mr. Hulbert’s salary was paid by the Home Office.

Mr. Hulbert told me that during the first year of the Thatcher government in 1979 he was working at his desk in the Home Office when he saw a document which suggested that PIE had received funding from the Home Office.

The document was a request for renewal of funding worth £35,000 (thus indicating that previous funding had been granted). Mr. Hulbert said he was concerned by this – both because of PIE’s public campaigning to abolish the age of consent and because he thought that the grant of funding conflicted with the aims and policies of another department - DHSS – which was responsible for child protection. He said that he raised the matter with his immediate manager, Mr. Clifford Hindley.

According to Mr. Hulbert, Mr. Hindley instructed him to drop his objections because (inter alia), PIE “was being funded at the request of Special Branch, which found it politically useful to identify people who were paedophiles”.

Mr. Hulbert told me that he decided not pursue his concerns because “at that time questioning anything to do with Special Branch – especially within the Home Office – was a ‘no-no’”. He did not discover whether the renewal of funding application had ever been sanctioned.

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25 This is a verbatim quote from my interview with Mr. Hulbert, who was recalling, to the best of his ability, the words used by Mr. Hindley. The interview took place by phone on June 18, 2014.
In 2013, Mr. Hulbert had approached Tom Watson MP. He told him exactly the same story as he told me, and Mr. Watson arranged for Mr. Hulbert to speak with officers from Operation Fernbridge. He was subsequently interviewed by, and gave a formal statement to, Fernbridge’s senior officer, Chief Inspector Paul Settle. The Home Office subsequently set up an enquiry. An experienced investigator was seconded from his regular duties at H.M. Customs and Excise. This investigator has not publicly been named, ostensibly to protect the sensitivity of his investigations. Given Mr. Hulbert’s account of what ensued, I believe the IICSA should know that his name was [REDACTED], and that (according to allegations by other journalists) he worked regularly with the intelligence services. If true, this would appear to be a significant potential conflict of interest.

According to Mr. Hulbert, Mr. [REDACTED] telephoned him and asked him to come in to the Home Office for a formal interview. Because of the tone and content of this conversation, Mr. Hulbert was nervous. He wrote to the Home Office requesting details of Mr. [REDACTED]’s rank in the civil service and asking for express permission from the Metropolitan Police (under whose aegis Operation Fernbridge was being conducted) to appear before Mr. [REDACTED].

Mr. Hulbert told me that he did not receive agreement to these requests and the proposed meeting “fell through”. He subsequently received a second telephone call from Mr. [REDACTED]: the contents of this conversation suggested to Mr. Hulbert that rather than conducting an investigation into the alleged Home Office funding of PIE, Mr. [REDACTED] might be seeking to hold a disciplinary hearing. Mr. Hulbert feared that this could find him in breach of the Official Secrets Act and could jeopardize government pension.

He thereafter asked Operation Fernbridge for a formal assurance that any answers he gave to Mr. [REDACTED]’s enquiries would not be used against him. He said that did not receive any such assurance.

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26 I confirmed this with Mr. Watson and with Operation Fernbridge.
As a result Mr. Hulbert did not meet with Mr. [REDACTED], preferring instead to submit a formal statement along the lines of that which he had already given to Operation Fernbridge. He told me that he subsequently made several phone calls and sent several e-mails to Mr. [REDACTED], to ensure that his statement had arrived. However, he said that he never received any response.

I agreed with Mr. Hulbert that I should write a piece for the Sunday Express, outlining his allegations but without identifying him. After this appeared, I arranged for Mr. Hulbert to be interviewed and identified by ITV News27. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Hulbert received no financial benefit of any kind for giving these two interviews.

In November 2014, the Home Office published the report of a review into Mr. Hulbert’s allegations, as well as into the Home Office’s knowledge of organised child sexual abuse allegations from 1979 - 1999. The Wanless Report (named for its head, Peter Wanless, chief executive of NSPCC) met Mr. Hulbert; he also spoke to Mr. [REDACTED]. The Report concluded:

“7.5. It is the reasonable conclusion of the senior investigator, taking all facts into account; including information both seen and heard, that on the balance of probabilities and in the absence of supporting evidence or a corroborative account, the alleged funding from VSU to PIE did not take place.

“7.6. There is clear evidence that VSU provided funding to organisations who were connected to PIE, namely Albany Trust and Princedale Trust. It is impossible to determine whether VSU funding provided to either of these organisations was indirectly used to support the work of PIE, but no evidence was found to conclude that it did.28”


However, the Report also indicated that there was no firm – let alone documentary - evidence to disprove Mr. Hulbert’s account and that therefore it could not be ruled out entirely.

“All Review 2 concluded that on the balance of probabilities, the alleged funding of PIE did not take place. While this represents the judgement of the original reviewer it is not a fully satisfactory answer to whether the Home Office ever directly or indirectly funded PIE.

“We cannot offer categorical assurance one way or the other. It is possible that a Special Branch inspired payment might have taken place - the official records offer no direct evidence to suggest it did, and no other civil servant we have had contact with has corroborated Mr Hulbert's memory, but the records are insufficiently complete to rule it out entirely.”29

In relation to the missing files and what the Home Office knew (and did with) allegations of organised child sexual abuse, Wanless concluded:

“... it is not possible at this remove of time on the information that has been made available to us to say precisely what was given to the Home Office throughout this period, or what action the Home Office took in relation to each allegation that was referred to it.

“No system of routinely recording such referrals existed then, or now. In those circumstances, on the material at the Home Office it is not possible to consider or comment with any confidence on how the police and prosecution authorities handled any material that was handed to them at the time30.”

One document which was noticeable by its absence from the Home Office files and enquiry reports was PIE’s membership list. This had originally been seized by the Metropolitan Police in the late 1970s.

29 Wanless: Page 33 (op. cit)
30 Wanless: Page 7 (op. cit)
Contemporary press reports, quoting Charles Oxley, a Scottish headmaster who had infiltrated the organization, put the number of members at around 1,000. However, the list itself had never been made public; and if the Home Office’s internal reviews of its files were accurate, neither had it been passed on by the Metropolitan Police.

In 2013 I learned the whereabouts of a copy of the list. I spent several months tracking down and then interviewing the person who held it. I ascertained that this person had come into possession of it while he was a serving police officer in the 1970s and 1980s. I was also able to discover where it had been kept in the intervening years: a full chain of custody, in other words. I was also assured that it had been sent to IICSA.

In 2015 a copy of the list was sent to me. I analyzed it carefully and found strong evidence that in the 1970s and 1980s both the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office had failed to assign sufficient importance to membership of PIE, and that children were subsequently sexually abused as a result.

The list I received is dated 1983 – 1984 (though there are handwritten annotations made, evidently by police officers, in 1985). These dates are important: they coincide with the period in which Leon Brittan, the Home Secretary, was under pressure to ban PIE.

There are 307 individuals listed as members. Four of the members were women. Most – though not all – of the 307 have a membership number beside their name. There are no recognizable politicians’ names on the list, although Sir Peter Hayman, the diplomat outed as a PIE member by Geoffrey Dickens MP in 1981 is included (his name, without any address, has been handwritten in pen).

Whilst I believe this copy to be identical to that previously provided to IICSA, I have included a copy of the list I received in the Appendices to this submission.
This number of members is lower than the widely reported figure of 1,000. I queried this with the former police officer who had held the list. He told me that the copy he had was only one version of what had been, originally, a much lengthier document. The original full list of members was, in those pre-computer days, physically photocopied, cut up and parceled out to several police forces. This copy of the list – the only one, to the best of my knowledge, still in existence – was the result of that process.)

The document I received shows that some effort had been made to establish the accuracy of the PIE membership records. 254 of the names were listed as UK residents: of these, addresses were shown and/or confirmed for 213 of them. Of the remaining 41, just one was found to be an assumed name; 11 addresses were “unknown” and 4 others were shown as no longer in existence. 16 individuals were found to be unknown at the address given for them, with a final nine showing no street address at all. Of the 53 foreign members, there was one each in Sweden, Norway, Luxemburg, Canada and Iran; 2 each in the Republic of Ireland and West Germany (as it was then); 5 in Australia, 13 in France and 24 in the United States.

There were few overt cross-references to criminal convictions. Of the UK residents listed, three (all men) were recorded as having criminal records: CRO numbers have been written, in pen, beside their names – but with no details of what offences were committed. Additionally, one other member was listed as being in prison – again with no offence details shown. These men with criminal records were rank and file members. The criminal convictions of PIE’s Executive Committee – a matter of public record - are not shown.

I do not have access to the Criminal Records Office database (maintained since 2006 by the Association of Chief Police Officers) or the former Criminal Records Bureau (now part of the Home Office Disclosure and Barring Service). Nor do I have access to the Police National Computer which also maintains a database of criminal records. It is therefore impossible to know how many of the 254 UK-resident PIE members on the 1983-84 list might subsequently have been convicted of child sexual abuse.
But I was able to consult some publicly available records which showed that several prominent PIE members on the list – notably Peter Bremner, Charles Napier, Leo Adamson and Terence Waters - were subsequently convicted of contact offences and IIOC.

There is also little or no indication in the list of an understanding that each of these PIE members posed a potential threat to children; nor of the relevance of their jobs.

Of the two clergymen listed, one was a senior army chaplain. Research in publicly available records indicates that this man appears later to have resigned his commission but also to have had a history of involvement with the Christian youth organization, the Boys’ Brigade.

Similarly, there were members whose address were those of a school. Member No. 132, for example, was a teacher at an independent prep school for boys. Publicly available records show that he quit teaching unexpectedly early, but continued – according to his obituary – to help young pupils by taking them to sports fixtures in his car and buying them equipment.

In none of these instances, involving highly sensitive professions involving regular access to children, is there any publicly-available record which suggests these PIE members were monitored by police or that their employers were warned that they posed a potential risk to children.
(ii) Leon Brittan & Operation Fernbridge

I first met senior officers from Operation Fairbank/Fernbridge on December 11, 2013. Four days earlier the investigative website Exaro News had published a story alleging that officers from Operation Fairbank had “seized a video that places a former Conservative cabinet minister at one of several parties where boys were sexually abused by men ... Exaro has also learned that police have ‘talked to’ the ex-minister about his attendance at the ‘sex party’”\(^{32}\).

The story was picked up and subsequently reported by mainstream newspapers. Although Exaro did not name the ex-minister, it was common knowledge amongst journalists that this was Leon Brittan (now Lord Brittan), the former Home Secretary.

I questioned the Fairbank/Fernbridge officers about this allegation. They denied it unequivocally and angrily. They insisted that no such video had been seized; nor had they “talked to” any ex-cabinet minister. According to the senior detective, the story had been invented and then given to Exaro by a man claiming to be a survivor of historic sexual abuse.

This man had been interviewed at length by Fairbank/Fernbridge: they believed that he had very probably been abused as a child, but that he was extremely vulnerable and suggestible; and that some of his key allegations had been wrong. In particular, the dates he gave for having been transported to Holland and sexually abused there showed him to have been an adult, not a child, when the abuse was alleged to have taken place.\(^{33}\)


\(^{33}\) This man would become a key early “witness” for several Exaro News stories. In 2015 he retracted or denounced some of these articles, claiming that Exaro either tricked or pressured him into naming Lord Brittan. I have since spoken to him and have confirmed his unhappiness at the way he says Exaro behaved.
The ‘sex party’ which the ex-cabinet minister was supposed to have attended was subsequently alleged to have taken place at Elm Guest House in Barnes, south west London. This was a guest house catering for gay men: it closed down in 1982 after a raid by the Metropolitan Police. Twelve boys gave statements to the police, alleging that they had been abused at EGH, but these were not pursued at the time and the owner, Haorun Kasir, was convicted of a single count of the minor offence of running a disorderly house, or brothel.

Between 1982 and 2013, a series of allegations had appeared on websites which alleged (variously) that underage sex parties had been held at EGH, attended by politicians (including Sir Cyril Smith), spies (Sir Anthony Blunt) and prominent entertainers. One website contained photographs of what it claimed were pages from EGH’s guest book, showing the names of politicians and celebrities.

Some of the young boys alleged to have been abused at these parties had, according to the websites, been taken there from care homes in the local area.

The senior Fairbank/Fernbridge officer told me that his unit had discovered evidence of abuse within these homes and that two men were to be charged. But although interviews were on-going, there was no evidence implicating ‘VIP paedophiles’.

On March 29, 2014, Exaro News and the Sunday Express published new allegations. These claimed that in 1982 H.M Customs & Excise had seized a video cassette which showed “child abuse in the presence of a former cabinet minister” and further that the retired Customs officer involved had been told by his former employers not to speak about the incident.

34 The men he named were Anthony McSweeney, a Catholic priest and John Stingemore, a care home manager. In March 2015, McSweeney was convicted of sexual assaults on a 15 year boy in the Grafton Close Children’s Home, and of making IIOC. Stingemore died before the case came to trial.

Once again the article did not name the ex-cabinet minister (though it did name the former Customs officer): however, it was common knowledge amongst journalists that the politician referred to was Leon Brittan.

The basis for the story was a notice of seizure of indecent or obscene articles by Customs & Excise, published in the London Gazette in 1982. It detailed the confiscation of “three untitled 8mm films, 1 video cassette entitled GB 10”, 1 video cassette entitled “Amsterdam Tramway Museum” 1 video cassette entitled “LB” and 1 order form imported into the United Kingdom and found at the Eastern Car Terminal, Dover Kent, England, on or about 18th January 1982”.

The owner of these items, at whom the seizure notice was aimed, was shown to be “R.H. Tricker36” with an address in Amsterdam. The seizing officer, named in the London Gazette notice, was a Mr. Maganlal Solanki.

In March 2014, a journalist for the Sunday Express tracked down Mr. Solanki, now retired, to his home address in Birmingham. The journalist went there and attempted to interview Mr. Solanki, covertly recording the encounter. A tape of the ‘interview’ was passed to Exaro; it was also passed on to three MPs.

The Exaro story alleged that “the retired Customs officer identified the former cabinet minister, but is so scared about the sensitive nature of the video that he refuses to say what the ex-minister is doing exactly.”

By chance I had a previously-arranged meeting with the senior officer from Operation Fernbridge scheduled for four days after the Exaro story appeared. On April 2, 2014 I met him at Empress State Building.

36 Russell H. Tricker was a convicted British paedophile who had emigrated to Amsterdam in the late 1970s.
Over a two hour interview, conducted in the building’s canteen/restaurant, this officer gave me what he said was the truth about the 1982 Customs seizure, Mr. Solanki, Elm Guest House and Leon Brittan.

I have no means of independently verifying the most important parts of his account (though I was able to obtain a copy of the Solanki recording which confirmed that part of the officer’s story. See below). However, his allegations are so serious that I believe it is important they be examined formally. Since Lord Brittan died in January 2015 no criminal proceedings can be brought; IICSA is therefore the only forum for these claims to be tested.

The senior officer stated that detectives from Operation Fernbridge had also interviewed Mr. Solanki, now in his 80s and somewhat infirm as a result of a series of strokes. Mr. Solanki had denied the Exaro/Express allegations. He had told Operation Fernbridge that he couldn’t remember anything about the 1982 seizure – and certainly not having viewed the Tricker tapes and films, thereby “identifying” the ex-cabinet minister.

But he went on to state that he did recall stopping Leon Brittan on another occasion – he could not recall the year - when the politician came into the port of Dover from Europe. Inside the politician’s car Mr. Solanki said he had found video tapes: he viewed these and saw that they were child pornography. The Fernbridge officer told me he asked Mr. Solanki what exactly was on the tapes: the retired Customs officer was embarrassed, but said they depicted boys and girls, clearly under 12, having sex with each other.

How, the detective asked, did he know the man he stopped was Leon Brittan? Mr. Solanki said he had asked to see the man’s passport. Additionally, Brittan had described himself as “an MEP”.

This posed a problem. Leon Brittan was never an MEP. He went from being an MP and government minister to being a European Commissioner. The detective eventually decided that since Mr. Solanki was very evidently telling the truth as he recalled it, he had most likely misheard the phrase “MEP”.

Submission to IICSA
Tim Tate: investigative journalist, author and documentary film-maker
July 30, 2016
Mr. Solanki told the detective that after he had seized the tapes, he sent Mr. Brittan on his way and referred the incident to his superiors. He also indicated that the seizure would have been recorded in the log book kept by Customs officers at Dover. The Fernbridge officer told me he was then making plans to look for these.

Nor, according to the senior officer, was this the only line of enquiry Operation Fernbridge was pursuing into Leon Brittan. A second and active strand involved Elm Guest House.

When the Metropolitan Police officers had raided Elm Guest House in 1982, they believed – correctly – that it was being used for (adult) male prostitution. However, the officer in charge of the raid had alerted the local social services department that there was a possibility at least one child might be on the premises and that, if so, a social worker and a place of safety would be needed.

The police did indeed find one child – a boy of around eight years old – in the guest house. He was taken to a local children’s home and, according to a document the Fernbridge detective found in council archives, was jointly interviewed by a detective constable and a social worker on the night of the raid.

Operation Fernbridge tracked down the (now-retired) constable in question. He was interviewed and described the boy as being the most sexualised child he had ever seen. He also said that the boy described being sodomised by nine adult men at the guest house, but seemed somewhat surprised that the police were interested. He told his interviewers that “Uncle Leon” would take care of the problem, and that “Uncle Leon” worked up at “the big house”. The constable said he had understood this to be a reference to Parliament and had realised that Uncle Leon was probably Leon Brittan.

All of this should have been recorded in a statement. But the Fernbridge team was surprised to discover that although a statement of sorts did exist, it was not signed by the boy; nor did it make any mention of “Uncle Leon”.
They questioned the retired constable: he explained that it was late at night when the boy was questioned and he had taken a joint decision with the social worker that the statement could be signed after the boy had got some sleep. But next morning the boy had “acted out” and refused to sign.

The Fernbridge officers also questioned the retired constable about why he hadn’t recorded the “Uncle Leon” information in the (unsigned) statement: he became uncooperative, giving them the distinct impression that he was concerned about either disciplinary proceedings or a potential threat to his police pension.

Fernbridge went on to track down the boy – now a man in his early 40s. Although he initially seemed willing to speak, he then refused to do so. Despite this, the senior officer concluded our meeting by saying that he was convinced that Leon Brittan had had an active sexual interest in children – but that he was unsure whether he would ever be able to bring any charges.

I followed up the meeting by obtaining a copy of the Solanki recording and transcribing it. This showed very clearly that the retired Customs officer had repeatedly declined to answer the journalist’s questions; had made no comments which could – even at a stretch – be interpreted as confirming that he had viewed the Tricker tapes nor had he identified Leon Brittan’s presence in them. Instead it is the journalist who repeatedly uses Brittan’s name, without any meaningful response from Mr. Solanki. To that extent, the senior Fernbridge officer’s account seemed to be accurate.

I then made FOI requests to HMRC (the successor organization to H.M. Customs & Excise) for information relating to the Tricker tapes seizure. These requests were rejected on the ground that HMRC owed a duty of confidentiality to a British taxpayer (Mr. Tricker). These refusals ignored the fact that Mr. Tricker was not at the time of seizure (or any other material time) a British taxpayer.

37 Attached in the Appendices to this submission
I have no means of knowing whether the story told by the senior officer from Operation Fernbridge is true (though I can see no benefit for him to have lied). Shortly after our interview he was removed from the investigation. I have not spoken with him since.


The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) ceased to exist in April 2006 when it was merged into the newly-created Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). In October 2013 SOCA was itself dissolved and its operations merged into the new National Crime Agency (NCA). Intelligence on organized paedophiles and those sharing or trading IIOC became part of the remit of a sub-command, CEOP (Child Exploitation and Online Protection Command).

In 2014 I was contacted anonymously by someone who claimed to work for CEOP. This person claimed that CEOP was severely under-resourced, having a full time complement of just seven officers; their workload was so overwhelming that, according to this informant, untrained staff were being brought in from other sections.

It was impossible to ascertain whether these allegations were factually correct. Although CEOP publishes an annual report, this does not break down staffing levels. Further, The National Crime Agency (and, thereby, its sub-commands) is specifically excluded from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. FOI requests are not accepted, and CEOPS has a policy of not commenting on specifics 38.

However, in the spring of 2014 I found anecdotal evidence which suggested that the CEOPS-operated system for collating and distributing intelligence about those producing IIOC was not functioning. The evidence emerged from a raid on the home of a 22-year-old Latvian man living in Skelmersdale, Lancashire, in February 2013.

38 Interview with CEOPS press officer May 8, 2014.
The raid followed a tip-off by the Russian interior ministry. It had discovered that a child pornography video file had been uploaded to a website based in the Russian Federation from an IP address in Britain. The information was passed to CEOPS: it identified the IP address as a private home in Skelmersdale and tasked the Lancashire force with carrying out a raid on the premises.

The home was owned by a Latvian-origin man and his wife who had two young children; however they shared the house with the man’s brother, a 22-year old factory worker called Andreas Bauminis. When confronted by Lancashire police, Andreas Bauminis admitted downloading child pornography involving girls as young as 11 from a Russian-based internet file sharing site. He refused, however, to discuss the file which, according to the Russian Interior Ministry, he had uploaded.

Officers seized and checked his computer. On it they found IIIOC images and films showing the sexual abuse of pre-pubescent girls. However one film was what appeared to be a 20-minute ‘snuff’ video: this showed a girl, approximately 15-years-old, being raped, then strangled with wire until she appeared lifeless.

During her ordeal the girl was seen to be foaming at the mouth with her eyes rolling back into her head. At the end she did not appear to be blinking or breathing, and her abuser was seen to wrap the body in a plastic sheet and drag it out of the room.

When the case came to court in 2014, police officers and the Crown Prosecution Service lawyers told the judge that they were convinced the girl had been killed on camera. Judge Denis Watson QC ruled that whilst it was difficult to say whether the girl in the video had died, “all the evidence points to the fact that she almost certainly did.”

I interviewed the Lancashire Police officer who had seized and viewed the video file. He said:

39 R. v Bauminis; Liverpool Crown Court, March 18, 2014
“The girl was white, with blond hair and a slim build. It was apparent that the man was either her father or step-father.

“The man began to shout obscenities at the girl. Then he sexually abused her before strangling her and sexually abusing her again. After that he laid out a clear plastic sheet – like a dustsheet for decorating and laid the body in this. He then wrapped the body tightly all over in this.

“It took about 2 or 3 minutes for this laying out and wrapping up to take place. I was convinced that this was not acting and that the girl was dead. If she had been play-acting when the plastic was wrapped around her face she could not have been able to keep so still and not react.

“If it was acting – and I do not believe it was – it was better than an Oscar-winning performance. You could see the girl’s face and eyes: they didn’t blink or move at all.

“The dialogue – of the man and the girl – was American. I believed, therefore that this abuse and killing took place in America. I also estimated – from the quality of the images – that it was fairly recent: no more than 2 or 3 years old.”

According to Mike Hames the former head of the Metropolitan Police Obscene Publications Squad (TO13)\(^\text{41}\), this video was the first “snuff” child pornography to ever be seized. It should have been the start of a major international investigation. Instead, nothing was done with it for at least 14 months.

The Bauminis videos should have been passed to CEOP almost immediately after they were seized. CEOP is part of an international law enforcement organisation – The Virtual Global Assistance Taskforce. Member bodies like CEOPS are required to share evidence like that found in Bauminis’ flat.

\(^{40}\) Interview (verbatim) with Det. Constable Edward Wenham, Lancashire Constabulary; May 7, 2014

\(^{41}\) Interview with retired Supt. Mike Hames, May 2014.
The particular reason for this is that the lead agencies of the Task Force – the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the US Customs Service “Operation Predator” – maintain a powerful “Child Victim Identification Program”. This is the world’s most exhaustive computer database of images of individual children used in child pornography. It is used to identify – and often rescue – these victims, as well as to prosecute their abusers.

But by May 2014 –14 months after the raid on Bauminis’ home – Lancashire Police admitted that it had not sent his videos and photographs to CEOPS. Instead there remained in the force’s evidence rooms42. As a result, CEOPS had not passed them on to the Virtual Task Force, and no action had been taken to attempt to identify either the murdered girl or the victims shown in the other seized IIOC. That, in turn, meant the abuser in the ‘snuff’ video, whose face was clearly visible, may have been free to abuse other children.

It is possible that the Bauminis case is an isolated glitch in the system of UK and international intelligence gathering on organized paedophiles and child pornographers. But because CEOP is insulated from scrutiny by FOI requests, it is impossible to be sure of this.

7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Twenty-six years ago I called for “a full and detailed enquiry into the incidents and effects” of child sexual abuse, organized paedophilia and the trading or sharing of child pornography (IIOC)43.

It is, in my view, greatly to the credit of former Home Secretary Theresa May that the IICSA was established in 2015, and that it has a sufficiently broad (and well-funded) remit to fulfill this task.

[42] Interviews with Lancashire Constabulary and CEOP press officers; May 2014. The files were sent to CEOP after I published this story in the Sunday Express.
The information presented in this submission raises disturbing questions about the priority and resources assigned to the investigation of organized paedophilia and the trade in child pornography from the 1970s forward. Those questions need answers.

The information also raises very difficult questions about the evidence gathered by Operation Fairbank/Fernbridge concerning alleged VIP, or politically important, child abusers. Those questions, too, need to be examined and answered.

IICSA has the powers to summon witnesses and to compel testimony under oath. It should use them.

I believe that the following individuals should be called to give evidence: it is important that they do so to provide clear and unequivocal answers about the information set out in this submission.

But it is just as important that they do so under oath: there have been repeated allegations (though often with no evidence cited) that pressure to remain silent has been brought to bear on police officers and other public officials. A summons to testify, backed by the fear of committing perjury, is an appropriate and effective way to break through this alleged intimidation.

Recommended Witnesses

(i) Supt. Iain Donaldson (Retired); Former head of TO13, the Metropolitan Police Obscene Publications Squad.

Supt. Donaldson will be able to explain which of his superior officers obstructed his efforts to re-focus TO13 from adult pornography to IIOC.

He will also be able to explain what happened to the information contained in the so-called “Tim Tate Lists” (derived from US Customs, US Postals and the Cook Report investigations) and why no prosecutions derived from them. Similarly, Supt. Donaldson can explain what was done with the information contained in the PIE Membership lists.
(ii) **Supt. Mike Hames (Retired). Former head of TO13, the Metropolitan Police Obscene Publications Squad.**

Supt. Hames will be able to clarify how and why TO13’s manual card index database was removed from it, and what effect this had on the investigation of organized paedophile activity and the distribution of IIOC.

(iii) **Det. Chief Insp. Bryan Drew. Former head of the paedophile unit at NCIS**

Chief. Insp. Drew will be able to explain why so few staff were assigned to his unit (in contrast to other NCIS teams). He will also be able to explain what happened to TO13’s manual card index. Finally, he should be able to offer clarification as to NCIS’ inability to obtain and/or disseminate data on British paedophiles travelling to (or living in) foreign countries for the purposes of sexually abusing children.

(iv) **Tim Hulbert, former VSO employee.**

Mr. Hulbert will be able to give – free of the intimidation he perceived – a full account of the PIE funding application he says he saw inside the Home Office.

(v) **Mr. [REDACTED], ‘Customs & Excise Investigator’ assigned to enquire into Mr. Hulbert’s allegations**

Mr. [REDACTED] will be able to clarify what he said to Mr. Hulbert and why this should have caused Mr. Hulbert to fear reprisals. Mr. [REDACTED] will also be able to answer (uncorroborated) claims that he has – or has had – a working relationship with the intelligence services.

(vi) **Det. Chief Insp. Paul Settle. Former head of Operation Fairbank/Fernbridge**

DCI Settle will be able to confirm (or deny) the information put forward in this submission about his team’s investigation of the late Lord Brittan. Specifically, he will be able to confirm (or deny) that former Customs officer Maganlal Solanki told Operation Fernbridge that he had stopped Mr. Brittan at Dover and had seized child pornography from him.
DCI Settle will also be able to clarify the results of Operation Fernbridge’s investigations into the alleged abuse at Elm Guest House and the role played (or otherwise) in it by Leon Brittan.

(vii) Maganlal Solanki. Former Customs & Excise officer
Mr. Solanki will be able to confirm (or deny) giving to operation Fernbridge the account of the alleged seizure at Dover contained in this submission.

(viii) Mark Sedwill. Permanent Secretary, the Home Office
Mr. Sedwill should be able to provide evidence concerning legal advice received by the Home Office in the 1970s and 1980s and which – allegedly – persuaded the Home Secretary not to proscribe the Paedophile Liberation Exchange organization.

(ix) The current head of CEOP
The head of CEOP should be required to provide data on the number of full-time officers working under his command (as opposed to the number of police officers under warrant available to him on request); of the numbers of cases currently under investigation, and of those which are either waiting to be assigned or have not been accepted by CEOP due to a lack of resources.

The head of CEOP should also be able to provide evidence as to the number of instances when it has provided IIOC images to the Global task Force; and how many of those have resulted in the identification of either an abuse victim or a perpetrator.

I am grateful to the IICSA for allowing this submission and for reading it. I am happy to answer any questions which may arise.

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